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AND THE PSLRA 
Briana Lynn Rosenbaum* 
In her Essay, Fact or Fiction: Flawed Approaches to Evaluating Market 
Behavior in Securities Litigation,1 Prof. Lipton describes a judiciary locked in 
an ongoing struggle to shape the private securities fraud remedy in the 
class action context.  In her Essay, Prof. Lipton focuses on, and laments, 
the evidentiary presumptions that courts have created to “ensure that . . . 
investors would have a remedy—and that markets would not be left 
vulnerable to manipulation.”2  Prof. Lipton explains that these 
presumptions, designed to simplify a complex body of  substantive law and 
related evidence, also result in “near-arbitrary” class certification decisions 
in the securities litigation context.3  In this Comment, I use these 
presumptions as inspiration for an inquiry into effects that the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) specifically, and Congressional 
procedural rulemaking more generally, have had on the procedural 
rulemaking choices of  the Supreme Court. 
Like Prof. Lipton, I too see a conflicted judiciary in the securities 
litigation context.  On the one hand, the PSLRA sharply limits the class 
action device in the securities context.4  As compared to general class 
action practice, class actions in the securities context are subject to 
increased oversight, heightened pleading standards, and more restrictive 
discovery.  On the other hand, the PSLRA also expressly creates a right to 
enforce securities fraud violations through aggregate litigation.  Thus, 
                                                             
* Associate Professor, University of  Tennessee College of  Law. Thank you to the 
organizers of  the Business Law: Connecting the Threads Conference who provided the 
opportunity for me to explore the ideas in this Comment and to Savannah Darnall for 
excellent research assistance.  
1 Ann M. Lipton, Fact or Fiction: Flawed Approaches to Evaluating Market Behavior in Securities 
Litigation, 20 TENN. J. BUS. L. 741 (2019). 
2 Id. at 744 
3 Id.  
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000).  In 1998, Congress limited the securities class action 
still further by preempting most state securities class actions through Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of  1998. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227. 
 
778 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20 
 
 
courts are left to harmonize two potentially conflicting aims: the 
resolution of  complex merits issues involved in Section 10(b) fraud claims, 
and the application of  class actions procedures that necessarily require 
some kind of  generalization, simplification, or aggregation of  data.  
The result, according to Prof. Lipton, is grim.  Prof. Lipton 
describes a judiciary that is stymied in the development of  law that should 
guide courts’ decisions regarding class certification.  For example, she 
explains that the fraud-on-the-market presumption, which allows a 
plaintiff  to meet the reliance element for an entire class action merely by 
showing that markets were running efficiently at the time of  a 
misrepresentation, has no grounding in an empirical understanding of  
how markets work, and is often unprovable.5  Nevertheless, these 
presumptions also make it easier to bring class actions.  As she argues, 
presumptions unique to securities doctrine “smooth out the most 
significant differences among class members,” and thus “facilitate the 
aggregation of  claims into a single class action.”6  Thus, “presumptions 
translate what would otherwise be a series of  individual questions about 
investors’ reliance on the alleged fraud into a common question regarding 
the fraud’s effect on the market.”7  This “transformation,” Prof. Lipton 
explains, is what allows plaintiffs in securities class actions to meet the 
requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) that common questions predominate over 
individual ones.8  
Despite this uncertainty (or, perhaps because of  this uncertainty 
some argue),9 securities class actions continue to thrive.  In fact, securities 
litigation is one of  the few areas where class action litigation is still going 
                                                             
5 Lipton, supra note 1, at 744. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at  766. 
8 Id.. 
9 For critiques of  class actions in the securities litigation context post-PSLRA, see, e.g., 
Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of  the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at 
Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151 (2009); Lynn A. Stout, Type 
I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 
(1996); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 913 (2003). 
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strong.10  It is also one of  the few substance-specific areas where Congress 
has enacted major procedural reform, specifically through the PSLRA.11  
In most other areas, litigants are finding it harder to seek aggregate judicial 
solutions for private harms.  Thus, scholars have documented the 
tightening of  procedural mechanisms, ultimately resulting in narrowing 
access to judicial processes, particularly in the context of  aggregate 
litigation.12  Examples include Supreme Court cases making motions to 
dismiss harder to bring, class actions harder to certify, and waivers of  class 
actions easier to enforce.13  Thus, procedural scholars opine that we are in 
an era of  procedural retrenchment, resulting in decreased access to judicial 
processes. 
Although this retrenchment of  judicial access is primarily thought 
to be a result of  judicial action, elsewhere, I argue that Congress plays a 
significant role in litigation reform and procedural retrenchment.14   It does 
so both through “major,” trans-substantive procedural reforms, like the 
Class Action Fairness Act, and through targeted procedural reforms, such 
as the PSLRA.15  
                                                             
10 See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND 
FUTURE 132 (Harvard Univ Press 2015) (explaining that only federal securities laws are 
“generally amenable to class action treatment,” although “even here the Court has 
reinterpreted the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine to impose additional burdens on the 
plaintiff ”); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of  Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 729, 827 
(2013) (listing securities fraud as an area were class actions “continue to thrive,” along 
with wage and hour cases, Employee Retirement Income Security Act cases, and “to a 
lesser extent,” antitrust cases). 
11 Briana L. Rosenbaum, The Legislative Role in Procedural Rulemaking Through Incremental 
Reform, 72 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
12 See id. at 103 (citing authorities). 
13 See infra notes 37 through 39 and accompanying text (describing cases).  
14 See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 104-06.  
15 Other examples of  targeted reforms include Congressional legislation related to class 
action cases involving immigrants, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-607, litigation filed by inmates, Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of  1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of  11, 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.), and employment 
discrimination cases, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act: The Consequence of  Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1777 (2003) 
(describing legislation).   
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Of  Congress’s targeted reforms, the PSLRA’s reform of  securities 
litigation may be one of  the most cited examples of  Congressional interest 
in the procedural rulemaking role.16  Congress’s express purpose was to 
discourage abuses in securities litigation, including the filing of  lawsuits 
for the singular purpose of  obtaining a settlement.17  To accomplish this, 
Congress implemented a complex procedural and substantive reform 
package.  Key provisions include requiring plaintiffs to plead with 
particularity when bringing claims based on misleading statements or 
omissions and scienter, strengthening Rule 11 by requiring mandatory 
findings at the final stage, and imposing a discovery stay during pre-trial 
motions.18  
The success of  the PSLRA as a measure of  litigation reform has 
been much debated, with some calling it an outright failure, and others 
noting cautious optimism.19  For the purpose of  this Comment, though, I 
will assume that Congress’s choice to implement targeted reforms like the 
PSLRA has, as noted above, led to the limited development of  law that 
should guide courts’ class certification decisions.  If  this is so, it leaves one 
to question how a Congressional choice to regulate procedure could lead 
to lack of  procedural innovation in the judiciary.  
To be clear, I do not mean to question the direct effects that the 
PSLRA has had on access to courts.  Those direct limitations—such as the 
                                                             
16 Congress’s success in passing legislation expressly designed to curb seemingly 
unmeritorious suits in the securities context stood in stark contrast to similarly 
intended, but failed, legislative efforts in other areas. For example, the same year that 
Congress passed the PSLRA, it failed to pass the Attorney Accountability Act of  1995, 
which included trans-substantive amendments to Rule 11 similar those in the PSLRA, 
including making sanctions mandatory for all cases. However, while Congress had the 
political ability to tackle the perceived problem of  frivolous litigation in a targeted 
litigation environment, it could not do so for general litigation.  Rosenbaum, supra note 
12, at 148.    
17 See Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)policing the Market: Congress's Flawed Approach to Securities 
Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 73-76 (2006) (discussing the “distrust of  litigation” that 
drove the PSLRA). 
18 See id. at 76-78; Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 124–25 (and accompanying citations).  
19 See sources cited supra note 10. See also Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 976 (2003) (conducting empirical 
studies and concluding that, while there was no reduction in the rate of  securities 
litigation “there is statistically significant evidence suggesting that the PSLRA improved 
overall case quality at least in the circuit that most strictly interprets the Reform Act's 
heightened pleading standard”). 
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heightened pleading requirement—are both clear and much debated.20 
The focus instead is on indirect effects of  the Congressional choice to 
enact targeted procedural rules, particularly on the institutional procedural 
rulemaking role of  the judiciary.  A useful, but imperfect, analogy is the 
constitutional doctrine of  field preemption.  Under this doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause to bar state action 
when a “scheme of  federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.’”21  Under this theory of  field preemption, the Court has 
prohibited state action regarding regulation of  ship vessels22 and of  
immigration.23  
Here, too, it is possible to see Congress’s decision to regulate 
procedure in targeted areas, such as securities litigation through the 
PSLRA, as “covering the field” of  procedural rulemaking in that 
substantive area.  The effect here could be similar to that in field 
preemption: it may be to prevent procedural rulemaking by the judiciary 
in the same field.  This would be so even if, like the states under the 
preemption doctrine, the judiciary would normally have rulemaking power 
in the area.  Thus, the question still remains, has Congress’s choice to enact 
legislation in the area of  securities litigation affected the procedural rule-
making choices of  the judiciary? There is some evidence that it has.  
Prof. Lipton argues that, through cases like Basic, the Supreme 
Court has “crafted ‘ham-fisted’ mechanisms for distinguishing meritorious 
cases from frivolous ones.”24  Although she presents many reasons to 
criticize these mechanisms, I will focus on her critique of  their motives. 
As noted above, the PSLRA was motivated, in large part, by a desire to 
curb frivolous litigation.  But Prof. Lipton argues that judicial 
presumptions in the securities context are, in fact, unable to distinguish 
“meritorious cases from frivolous ones” and can “insulate even ‘dastardly’ 
frauds so long as defendants can manipulate their disclosures sufficiently 
                                                             
20 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10, 20.  
21 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks and case citations omitted). 
22 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165–66 (1978). 
23 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941). 
24 Lipton, supra note 1, at 772. 
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to match doctrinal rigidities.”25   She paints a picture of  a judiciary refusing 
to make deliberate choices of  “where to allocate the burden of  uncertainty 
for an injury” that is inherently uncertain and complex.26  
The Court has declined to adopt some of  the more obvious 
solutions to curtailing perceived abuses in securities litigation on a number 
of  occasions.  This, despite urging by parties and amici in multiple cases. 
For example, in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Hallliburton II”), 
the Supreme Court rejected the request to reverse the fraud on the market 
(and efficient markets) standard, citing the PSLRA.27  In doing so, the 
Court explained that Congress, by enacting the PSLRA, had “responded” 
to the frivolous litigation and efficiency concerns.28  Such legislative action 
demonstrated for the Court not only the Congress had addressed the very 
concerns raised, but also “Congress’s willingness” to do to.29  In short, the 
Court said, take this up with Congress if  you want to address frivolous 
litigation in a different way.30  
The Supreme Court said something similar in Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds when it declined to change the Basic 
presumption.31  The Court explained that Congress had enacted the 
PSLRA specifically to prevent “abuse, including the ‘extract[ion]’ of  
‘extortionate settlements’ of  frivolous claims.”32  Congress “fortified the 
                                                             
25 Id.  
26 Id. 
27 573 U.S. 258, 277 (2014). 
28 Id. 
29 Id.   
30 See Ann M. Lipton, Halliburton and the Dog That Didn't Bark, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 1, 25 (2015) (arguing that, since the Court in Halliburton II refused to 
consider settlement pressure as a reason to change the Basic presumption, they also 
should not “stand sentry” over the related the efficiency and price impact 
determinations at the class certification stage).  
31 568 U.S. 455, 475 (2013); COFFEE, supra note 11, at 130 (noting that, while Halliburton 
II did not reject the Basic presumption, it did “tilt the playing field marginally in 
defendant’s favor” by making the presumption rebuttable). Cf. Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation– In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811–
14 (1983) (critiquing cannons of  statutory construction that “impute omniscience to 
Congress”). 
32 568 U.S. at 475 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–369, pp. 31–32 (1995)).  
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PSLRA,” the Court reasoned, by later enacting the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of  1998, which preempted most state securities 
class actions.33  Furthermore, the Court was persuaded by the fact that 
Congress rejected a number of  proposals to undo the fraud-on-the-
market presumption endorsed in Basic, all “[w]hile taking these steps to 
curb abusive securities-fraud lawsuits.”34  For the Court, this all amounted 
to both Congressional approval of  both the Basic presumption and a 
reason to reject calls to “reinterpret[] Rule 23.”35  
The Court’s hesitancy to make changes in the securities litigation 
context stands in sharp contrast to the judicial procedural innovation in a 
host of  other areas, such as in general pleadings standards, discovery, class 
actions.  Notably, Congress has either failed to act in these areas, or only 
acted in incremental ways.  I will use class certification standards as an 
example.  
As noted, the Supreme Court has, over several cases, made it 
harder for plaintiffs to bring class action lawsuits. Beginning in 2011, the 
Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes precluded all but “incidental” 
damages in (b)(2) class actions and raised the standard for commonality in 
all class actions, requiring not just a single “common question,” but a 
“common contention” that will “resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of  each one of  the claims in one stroke.36  That same year, the 
Court upheld arbitration and class action waiver clauses in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, finding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted 
California state law classifying most class arbitration waivers as 
unconscionable.37  Two years later in 2013, the Court made it more 
difficult to bring Rule 23(b)(3) claims in cases in which there are questions 
about the ability of  damages to be measured on a class wide basis.38  
                                                             
33 Id. at 476 (citing 112 Stat. 322). 
34 Id. at 476. 
35 Id. at 477. 
36 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
37 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); see also Spokeo v. Robins, 
136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (holding that mere statutory violations did not equate to 
cognizable real-world harm).  
38 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013). For an analysis of  the Court’s trend 
restricting class actions, see Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the 
Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971 (2017). 
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By contrast, Congress has attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to 
change the class action certification requirements numerous times.  For 
example, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of  2017 (FICALA), 
which passed the House but not the Senate in 2017, would have restricted 
class actions in a number of  ways, including by limiting fees in class actions 
to a percentage of  money actually distributed to the class and adopting a 
class ascertainability standard.39  Similar measures exist in previous failed 
proposals, such in the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering 
Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of  2016.40  
What does all of  this show? First, in a broad sense, the Court is 
quite willing to address the problem of  frivolous litigation.  It has acted 
though cases like Wal-mart and Comcast to further this goal.41  The Court’s 
choice to further such a policy should not come as a surprise, as two of  
the three principles embodied in the Federal Rules governing the judiciary 
are “speed” and lack of  expense (the third being “just” resolution of  
actions).42   
Second, and by contrast, in the securities litigation context, the 
Court shows reluctance to address the same problem, specifically citing 
Congressional action in the area.  As the Court explained in Amgen, 
“[b]ecause Congress has homed in on the precise policy concerns raised” 
by Amgen, “’[w]e do not think it appropriate for the judiciary to make its 
own further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 23 to make likely success 
on the merits essential to class certification in securities-fraud suits,’”43  
Thus, at least in the context of  aggregate litigation and the perceived 
problem of  frivolous litigation, the Court appears reluctant to utilize its 
                                                             
39 Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act 
of  2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong., at § 105 (2017) (as passed by the House on Mar. 9, 
2017). 
40 Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act 
of  2016, H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. (2016)  
41 Coffee, supra note 11, at 135 (explaining that the Court in Wal-mart impliedly 
addressed the problem of  the theory of  extortion, or the fact that “inevitable 
aggregation of  strong individual cases with weak cases in a class action may give 
enhanced (and unjustified) settlement value to weak claims”).  
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  
43 Amgen, 568 U.S. at 477. 
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inherent procedural rulemaking role, at least when Congress has itself  
considered the problem, and thus “covered the field.” 
Robert Klonoff, in his article reviewing developments in class 
action jurisprudence, has suggested that in cases like Amgen, the Supreme 
Court may be pulling back on its class action reform stance and rejecting 
the “mantra” that class actions class actions inevitably lead to “blackmail 
settlements” induced by “intense pressure to settle”).44  While this may be 
true, it may also be that the Court is selectively choosing the contexts in 
which it is willing to engage in the frivolous litigation debate.  We may 
soon have an answer to this quandary, as the Court is soon expected to 
issue a decision in Frank v. Gaos, which concerns when courts may approve 
class action settlements that distribute portions of  proceeds to third 
parties.45  As Congress has specifically chosen not to act on the cy pres 
issue46 (thus, theoretically, leaving the “field” open), it will be interesting 
to see if  the Court does.  
If  judicial procedural innovation is being stalled by targeted 
Congressional procedural efforts, one might also wonder if  any potential 
change in the area of  securities litigation will happen some other way.  As 
Richard Marcus has said, “One seeming constant is the urge to reform.”47  
One answer could be through parties and interest groups.48  These groups 
may be emboldened and mobilized by targeted Congressional reform like 
the PSLRA, and thus could be uniquely able to affect future procedural 
reform, either through further legislative change, lobbying for federal rules 
changes, or litigation advocacy.49  Another possibility is that other 
                                                             
44 See Klonoff, supra note 39, at 980-82.   
45 Ronald Mann, Argument analysis: Justices skeptical of  “cy pres” class-action 
settlements, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 1, 2018, 1:28 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-justices-skeptical-of-cy-pres-
class-action-settlements/ 
46 Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of  2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong., at § 1718 
(2017) (as passed by the House on Mar. 9, 2017).   
47 Richard L. Marcus, Modes of  Procedural Reform, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
157, 185 (2008). 
48 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of  Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 922-26 (1999) (describing the role of  
interest groups in the public choice problems that arise in rulemaking).  
49 Id. at 904 & nn. 60, 175-97 and accompanying text (discussing lobbying in the 
rulemaking process).  
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institutions might pick up the baton, taking on the role of  reform in the 
area.  As an example, SEC Commissioner Jay Clayton announced in April 
2018 that the SEC had begun reviewing its rule prohibiting mandatory 
arbitration in corporate by-laws.50  According to John Coffee, such a move 
would “effectively preclude” securities class actions.51   
Ultimately, this Comment cannot fully answer the question 
regarding the institutional effects of  targeted Congressional rulemaking 
on the procedural rulemaking choices of  the judiciary.52 However, it is 
hoped that the examples described here and in Prof. Lipton’s Essay will 
shed further light on Congress’s role in the current development of  
securities class actions in the courts, and in judicial procedural rulemaking 
more broadly.  Sarah Staszak, a leading institutional scholar focusing on 
access to courts, posited that, “[i]n a complex governing arrangement 
where institutions, each with their own entrenched interests, have to 
negotiate how best to govern, institutional change (of  any kind) must be 
explained in an interbranch context.”53  That is certainly true of  the change 
wrought by Congress through the PSLRA.  
                                                             
50 Alison Frankel, SEC Chair Clayton is in no rush for mandatory shareholder arbitration, 
REUTERS (April 27, 2018, 2:58 PM), (https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-
arbitration/sec-chair-clayton-is-in-no-rush-for-mandatory-shareholder-arbitration-
idUSKBN1HY2QL).  
51 Coffee, supra note 11, at 132. 
52 See Bone, supra note 49 at 921 (1999) (arguing that greater involvement by Congress 
in procedural rulemaking had resulted in concrete changes to the court-centered 
rulemaking process); Richard D. Freer, Civil Procedure: The Continuing Gloom About Federal 
Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 455 (2013) (explaining that “[b]ecause it acts 
in the shadow of  Congress—under the threat that those it disappoints can go to the 
Capitol—the [Federal Rules] Committee may have an incentive to stay away from topics 
that will push too many hot buttons” but “[i]t does so sporadically and unpredictably”). 
53 Sarah Staszak, Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State, 38 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 222, 241 (2013).  
